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The two books under discussion here, taken together, provide a fine exam-
ple of how the material object is situated at the intersection and overlapping
of many contemporary disciplines - and how this situation gives rise to some
fruitful talk across disciplinary boundaries.
Christopher Brown’s study, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, is a
straightforward philosophical discussion of the ontology of compound ma-
terial objects. The title is an allusion to a well-known logical “puzzle,” the
puzzle of the Ship of Theseus, with which Brown begins his book:
Imagine a ship, whose sole function is to make a yearly voyage to a
neighbouring country in order to honour a heroic deed from the past.
The ship in question is composed of wooden planks, and her shape
might be described as very distinctive. After a few years of making
her yearly voyage, the ship’s planks begin to weather. The crew de-
cides that henceforward, before the ship sets sail each year, they will
replace the weathered planks of the ship with new ones. Eventually,
all of the planks of the original ship are replaced. Now [if] someone .
. . collects the planks that are disposed of [and] giv[es] those planks
the same distinctive configuration they had when they composed the
original ship at the time of her first voyages[,] . . . someone might
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well wonder which ship is numerically identical to the original ship.
Is it the continuous ship, which continues to make the yearly voyage
to the neighbouring country and whose spatio-temporal history is
continuous with that of the original ship, or is it the reconstructed
ship, which is composed of the same set of planks as the original
ship? (2)
The distinctive feature of Brown’s study is that he then spends most of
the book discussing how this puzzle would be solved by the great thirteenth-
century Catholic theologian and philosopher Saint Thomas Aquinas. He
does this by extracting from Aquinas’s writings, and to an extent “translat-
ing” into contemporary philosophical language, his views on material sub-
stances in general and on the composition of material objects, showing that
Aquinas has a complete and coherent theory of the constitution of material
objects that would allow for a Thomistic answer to the puzzle of the Ship of
Theseus and to a number of other, similar logical conundrums debated by
contemporary philosophers. 
All this is done in a highly accessible style that makes the presentation
of complex issues easy to follow. For readers such as myself, who are fas-
cinated by the intellectual life of the past, the book provides a clear and
comprehensible account of the views of a great medieval scholar and shows
why the theology of Aquinas was so immensely influential. What is less
clear is what it would mean for a contemporary philosopher to adopt a
Thomistic view of materiality.
What Brown’s book does not directly state, but nonetheless makes
abundantly clear, is that Aquinas’s ontology of material objects is derived
from his position on the nature of the human being. For Aquinas, human be-
ings, like other living things, consist of both a soul and a material body. Un-
like the souls of other living things, such as the souls of plants and animals,
the human soul is uniquely capable of existing separately from its material
body, although this condition is, for Aquinas, a temporary state (between the
death of the body and its ultimate resurrection), which has to be considered
unsatisfactory for both parties.
Aquinas supports this theological position by constructing it on the ba-
sis of Aristotle’s philosophy of form and matter, which allows him to argue
that the soul is the “substantial form” of the human being. Non-human liv-
ing things, and material elements such as gold or oxygen, also have sub-
stantial forms, though these are not directly created by God but originate
from matter by means of a natural process, and cannot survive being sepa-
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rated from matter. But for Aquinas, compound material objects (such as hu-
man bodies separate from their souls) do not have substantial forms and
therefore are not as “real” as - cannot be said to exist in the same sense as -
the material elements that compose them. Instead, they are something like
aggregates of elements, which is why they decay and disintegrate when sep-
arated from their substantial form. 
There is no doubt that this was a fascinating topic for the thirteenth cen-
tury, when the issue of the nature of the human body, with and without its
soul, was of crucial importance. And indeed, Aquinas’s philosophy has far-
reaching implications for the medieval conception of the body. One direct
consequence of a Thomistic interpretation of what it means to be human is
that the “resurrection of the body” must be understood in a very literal sense,
as a re-assembling of all the scattered pieces of my actual physical body, to
be reunited with its individual soul, which has been existing in a kind of in-
termediate and incomplete state in anticipation of this moment. This late-
medieval view of individuation as necessitating corporeality (including gen-
dered corporeality) has been extensively explored by Carolyn Walker
Bynum (see especially Bynum’s Fragmentation and Redemption). Among
other things, Bynum traces the implications of the Thomistic understanding
of corporeality for late-medieval conceptions of gender, since God was in-
carnate in the womb of a woman (no matter how virginal). All in all, the
work of Aquinas provided the philosophical foundations for Western no-
tions of corporeality for centuries, and gave a new dignity to human exis-
tence in the world. The body could no longer be dismissed as merely the ma-
terial prison of the soul, something to be disciplined and starved into sub-
jection until finally it was sloughed off in death.
Thus, an understanding of the Thomistic position is certainly of interest
to medieval scholars. What I don’t quite understand is what relevance -
aside from being an elegant exercise in logic - it might have for twenty-first-
century philosophy. At a time when modern physics has rendered the very
concept of the “material” vaguely obsolete, it is difficult to believe that con-
temporary philosophers could seriously debate the nature of material ob-
jects in terms of form and matter, substance and accident. 
But there is one aspect of Brown’s presentation of Aquinas that in fact
implies an attractively modern view of at least certain material objects,
namely those objects that he calls “artefacts,” things manufactured by hu-
man beings. Artefacts, for Aquinas, are compound material objects and,
therefore, do not have their own substantial forms, although there is no
doubt that they have material existence, since they are made up of material
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parts that are themselves substances. Instead, Aquinas seems to propose that
artefacts exist “only in virtue of . . . the attitudes of some agent extrinsic to
the artefact. For example, an axe is what it is because of the function that
some human beings have given to it” (100). The human agent gives the ma-
terials that compose the object an “accidental” form, a form ascribed to them
in addition to their substantial existence. An artefact is a material object that
has been given a certain shape - or even simply a certain purpose or func-
tion - “such that [it] signifies something beyond itself” (102). A statue, for
example, is “the accidental being that is a composition of a substance (the
piece of bronze) and a certain accidental form” given to it by the artist (102).
If the statue is melted down, the bronze that composed its substance will still
exist, but the statue will not.
Brown argues his case here on the basis of the intention of the human
agent that makes the artefact. But I would propose that Aquinas’s position
potentially implies something else, namely a view of artefacts as socially
constituted entities. A statue is a statue not only because the artist that made
it intended it to be so, but at least as much because the artist’s audience per-
ceives it to be a statue. An object that consists of a flat wooden surface with
four cylindrical wooden pieces attached to it is a “table,” not because it pos-
sesses an intrinsic quality of “table-ness,” but because in our society we
have a concept of “table,” associated with a function or use (of a surface on
which certain kinds of objects may be placed and around which humans
may be seated, often in order to use those objects), so that a material object
configured in an appropriate manner is socially and culturally recognized by
us as a table. In other words, artefacts are understood to be what they are be-
cause they are socially constituted as such. And, because they are not sim-
ply material objects but socially constituted objects, they do not serve only
practical functions but always, inevitably, also symbolic/semiotic/commu-
nicative functions. In other words, cultural objects are never just objects but
always also signs; on the simplest level they are, as Roland Barthes said,
signs of their own - social - use (41).
Such a view of material objects is of very great interest to contempo-
rary theory, as demonstrated by the second book to be discussed here, the
collection of essays entitled The Biography of the Object in Late Medieval
and Renaissance Italy. This is a very different kind of book. Its somewhat
heterogeneous contents (partly explained by its origin as a group of confer-
ence papers) is countered by the frequent references made, with near-reli-
gious fervour, by the majority of the authors to a common source, another
volume of essays entitled The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cul-
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tural Perspective. Since this second volume (particularly the Introduction
by the editor Arjun Appadurai and the theoretical essay by Igor Kopytoff)
seems to constitute the source texts for the volume I am discussing, I feel a
brief presentation of its views is in order.
The Appadurai volume began twenty years ago as a dialogue between
anthropologists and historians in the context of an ethnohistory workshop at
the University of Pennsylvania. The perspective adopted is thus explicitly
interdisciplinary, as well as neomarxist and semiotic:
Commodities, and things in general, are of independent interest to
several kinds of anthropology. They constitute the first principle and
the last resort of archeologists. They are the stuff of “material cul-
ture,” which unites archeologists with several kinds of cultural an-
thropologists. As valuables, they are at the heart of economic anthro-
pology and, not least, as the medium of gifting, they are at the heart
of exchange theory and social anthropology generally. The commod-
ity perspective on things represents a valuable point of entry to the re-
vived, semiotically oriented interest in material culture . . . but com-
modities are not of fundamental interest only to anthropologists. They
also constitute a topic of lively interest to social and economic histo-
rians, to art historians, and, lest we forget, to economists, though each
discipline might constitute the problem differently. Commodities thus
represent a subject on which anthropology may have something to of-
fer to its neighboring disciplines, as well as one about which it has a
good deal to learn from them. (Appadurai 5)
Although many different disciplines are interested in artefacts, they
clearly treat their objects differently. Appadurai points to one major distinc-
tion, that of what he (with Kopytoff) calls the “cultural biography” of indi-
vidual objects as opposed to the “social history” of things and classes of
things over time. He also points out that certain kinds of objects are more
symbolic than others. In particular, luxury goods are very heavily invested
with social and cultural meaning, so much so that Appadurai proposes to re-
gard them as 
goods whose principal use is rhetorical and social, goods that are
simply incarnated signs . . . it might make more sense to regard lux-
ury as a special “register” of consumption (by analogy to the linguis-
tic model) than to regard them as a special class of things. The signs
of this register, in relation to commodities, are some or all of the fol-
lowing attributes: (1) restriction, either by price or by law, to elites;
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(2) complexity of acquisition, which may or may not be a function of
real “scarcity”; (3) semiotic virtuosity, that is, the capacity to signal
fairly complex social messages . . . (4) specialized knowledge as a
prerequisite for their “appropriate” consumption . . . and (5) a high
degree of linkage of their consumption to body, person, and person-
ality. (38)
This semiotic, anthropological perspective would thus allow us to jux-
tapose such disparate things as French wines, medieval relics, and the shell
necklaces of the kula trade in the Massim Islands off the tip of New Guinea.
The comparison is not gratuitous, since it may well lead us to notice aspects
of supposedly familiar objects that we had not noticed before. It also points
up the central role, in the treatment of luxury goods, of the kind of cultural
knowledge that Pierre Bourdieu calls symbolic capital. Altogether, Appadu-
rai’s and Kopytoff’s project bears a close resemblance to Bourdieu’s.
The volume of essays edited by Olson, Reilly and Shepherd is inspired
most directly from Igor Kopytoff’s paper. Indeed, the title of the book, The
Biography of the Object in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy, directly
echoes Kopytoff’s instructions about how to do “the biography of a thing”:
In doing the biography of a thing, one would ask questions similar to
those one asks about people: What, sociologically, are the biographi-
cal possibilities inherent in its “status” and in the period and culture,
and how are these possibilities realized? Where does the thing come
from and who made it? What has been its career so far, and what do
people consider to be an ideal career for such things? What are the
recognized “ages” or periods in the thing’s “life,” and what are the
cultural markers for them? How does the thing’s use change with its
age, and what happens to it when it reaches the end of its usefulness?
(66-67)
Most of the contributors to the volume are art historians, and the papers
(most of which were originally presented as a special session at the 2002 In-
ternational Congress of Medieval Studies at Kalamazoo, Michigan) repre-
sent a deliberate attempt to apply Appadurai’s and Kopytoff’s method to art
history, another discipline that studies objects. 
In his discussion of the “very complex social forms and distributions of
knowledge” inherent in commodities, Appadurai distinguishes between “the
knowledge (technical, social, aesthetic, and so forth) that goes into the pro-
duction of the commodity; and the knowledge that goes into appropriately
consuming the commodity,” though the two forms of knowledge “are sus-
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ceptible to mutual and dialectical interaction” (41). This distinction reap-
pears in the volume by Olson, Reilly and Shepherd as a division into three
sections: the creation of the object, the life of the object, and the after-life of
the object. The papers in the first section are the least related to Appadurai’s
perspective, though one of them, a fascinating study of the glazes used by
the painters of majolica pottery in sixteenth-century Italy, would certainly
lend itself to a treatment of specialized knowledge as cultural capital. 
The papers in the second section begin to demonstrate what an anthro-
pological perspective on art history can accomplish. They concentrate on
domestic furnishings and luxury goods, items that were used both function-
ally in the household and for social display. The papers neatly demonstrate
how one kind of use merges into another: the carved wooden chests known
as forziere da sposa or betrothal chests, for example, were used in fifteenth-
century Florence as containers to transport the bride’s dowry to her new hus-
band’s house, as well as after the wedding to store valuable household
goods, so they certainly had a use function. At the same time, however, the
procession of the bride through the streets of the city “was one of the most
public and highly visible moments of the marriage ritual” (58), and the rich-
ly decorated chests with their implied cargo of luxury goods thus also served
the symbolic purpose of conveying to all onlookers the wealth and status of
the respective families of the bride and groom - and, hence, help to maintain
that status. The same delicate interplay between use and meaning can be
seen in the jewellery owned by Roman prostitutes: rhetorically treated as
“gifts” from male “friends” that also served to adorn and advertise the
woman’s body, the same pieces could re-enter circulation as valuables to be
pawned, sold or exchanged (77). This is decidedly more interesting stuff
than the traditional art-historical discussions of styles and influences that
isolate the “aesthetic object” from any contact with the mundane world.
Part three of the book, the after-life of objects, is the section where tra-
ditional and new perspectives are most easily combined. The four papers in
this section are concerned with traditional objects of art and architectural
history - an icon and its copies, the choir screen of a cathedral, the decora-
tion of an early medieval chapel, the reconstruction of a small private dis-
play room in a ducal palace. The objects themselves are comfortably
viewed as symbolic, since they were all originally produced for essentially
semiotic purposes; they were meant to communicate. They are also objects
that lend themselves particularly well to “biographies”: the episodes in
their individual histories are part of significant social and cultural changes.
This is fertile ground for new approaches. Looking at how these objects are
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re-shaped and circulated tells us things about how changing social contexts
re-construct and re-interpret the objects themselves and use them to project
new messages.
There is one more aspect of Appadurai’s and Kopytoff’s approach that
the papers in this volume demonstrate, and that is the intimate relationship
between the circulation of symbolic commodities and the maintenance of
social power. Appadurai comments that 
it is in the interests of those in power to completely freeze the flow of
commodities, by creating a closed universe of commodities and a
rigid set of regulations about how they are to move. Yet the very na-
ture of contests between those in power (or those who aspire to
greater power) tends to invite a loosening of these rules and an ex-
pansion of the pool of commodities. . . . So far as commodities are
concerned, the source of politics is the tension between these two ten-
dencies. (57) 
In other words, the circulation of symbolic artefacts is to a great extent po-
litically motivated. Control of the circulation of symbolic artefacts is an im-
portant mechanism by which power is maintained. But, as several of the
contributions to The Biography of the Object in Late Medieval and Renais-
sance Italy show, to be effective, this mechanism must be demonstrated: the
artefacts must be seen to circulate. And once they are in circulation, it is al-
ways possible that they will be diverted, to support the acquisition of pow-
er by new groups or individuals. 
The study of objects - how they are created, why and for whom; how
they are used, displayed, interpreted, re-interpreted and misinterpreted, even
how they are conceived and thought of - thus provides a pathway into the
heart of the life of societies other than our own; not only their material life,
but their whole cultural, spiritual, even political world. This, it seems to me,
is the most compelling attraction of both history and anthropology: not
“translating” the other into our own terms, but attempting to understand it
on its own terms. In the opinion of this reviewer, such an approach is a good
deal more interesting than traditional history, whether of art or philosophy.
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
Greece
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